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In Placing Profits Above Hippocrates: The Hypocrisy of General Ser-
vice Hospitals, I discussed some of the inappropriate means that general
service hospitals (GSHs) have used against specialty hospitals to preserve
the former's market dominance.' In response to Placing Profits Above Hip-
pocrates, the Chief Executive Officer of the St. Vincent Medical Center
(Peter Banko) wrote to me-as well as to the head of the University for
whom I work (Chancellor Joel Anderson)-to say why he, Peter Banko,
believed that Placing Profits Above Hippocrates was, well, wrong. In this
article, I respond to Mr. Banko's primary concerns.2
Specialty hospitals, frequently physician owned, focus on a specific
medical field3-often high dollar fields, such as orthopedics, cardiology,
surgery, and women's care.4 General service hospitals, in contrast, are full
service entities and generally are "nonprofit"5 institutions. 6 GSHs typically
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1. Robert Steinbuch, Placing Profits Above Hippocrates: The Hypocrisy of General
Service Hospitals, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 505 (2009).
2. This article repeats portions of Placing Profits Above Hippocrates to introduce new
readers to the discussion. For the convenience of the readers, the citations will be to the
original sources rather than Placing Profits Above Hippocrates.
3. Battle Lines Drawn over Specialty Hospitals, AAMC REPORTER (May 2006), avail-
able at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/may06/specialty.htm [hereinafter AAMC
REPORTER].
4. John K. Iglehart, The Emergence of Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals, 352 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 78, 78 (2005), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/352/l/78.pdf.
5. A nonprofit seeks to make profits, but they are not distributed to owners. Rather,
they are reinvested into the entity after all expenses, including salaries of the Board and
executives are paid. See GARY M. GROBMAN, THE NONPROFIT HANDBOOK: EVERYTHING YOU
NEED TO KNOW TO START AND RUN YOUR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION 25 (4th ed. 2005).
6. Iglehart, supra note 4, at 79. ("The GAO also reported that more than ninety percent
of the specialty hospitals that have opened since 1990 are for-profit entities, as compared
with twenty percent of all general hospitals. Specialty hospitals are much less likely than
general hospitals to have emergency departments (forty-five percent vs. ninety-two percent)
or to treat Medicaid or uninsured patients. In 2001, specialty hospitals accounted for an esti-
mated $871 million, or one percent, of Medicare's spending on inpatient services, nearly
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make their highest profit from cardiac, orthopedic, and general surgical ser-
vices. 7 As a consequence of their desire to hold onto their most profitable
cases, GSHs often attempt to undermine the development of competing spe-
cialty hospitals.8
GSHs typically criticize specialty hospitals by arguing that (1) the spe-
cialty hospitals threaten the viability of GSHs by competing for reve-
nue-generating cases, which GSHs often use to finance "unprofitable" ser-
vices such as emergency rooms, and (2) the existence of specialty hospitals
fosters conflicts of interest for physicians who refer patients to their own
hospitals. 9
II. UNDERMINING SPECIALTY HOSPITALS
In Little Rock, Arkansas, the three most notable GSHs are University
of Arkansas for Medical Sciences Hospital, Saint Vincent Infirmary Medi-
cal Center, and Baptist Medical Center. There are also two specialty hospit-
als: the Arkansas Heart Hospital and the Arkansas Surgical Hospital. These
specialty hospitals actively compete on the claim that they generally provide
better care than that provided at GSHs.' 0
In Placing Profits Above Hippocrates, I discussed how some GSHs
have adopted economic credentialing policies, i.e., rules based on "econom-
ic criteria unrelated to quality of care or professional competence in deter-
mining a physician's qualifications for initial or continuing hospital medical
staff membership or privileges."' 1 This stands in contrast to what occurred
two-thirds of which went to facilities that treat patients with cardiac disorders.").
7. Id. at 78.
8. Id. at 83.
9. AAMC REPORTER, supra note 3. ("'The AAMC is concerned that specialty hospitals
treat disproportionately low shares of very sick and uninsured and under-insured patients,
create conflicts of interest, and negatively impact the revenue centers of teaching hospitals,'
said Richard Knapp, executive vice president of the AAMC and head of the office of gov-
erment relations."); Sujit Choudhry, Niteesh K. Choudhry & Troyen A. Brennan, Specialty
Versus Community Hospitals: What Role for the Law?: A Paradox Exists in the Mixed Mar-
ket/Regulatory Posture of U.S. Health Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS: THE POLICY JOURNAL OF THE
HEALTH SPHERE (Aug. 9, 2005), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w5.361/DC1 [hereinafter Choudhry et
al.] ("General hospitals warn that specialty hospitals threaten their financial viability and
quality of care by reducing the volume of procedures performed in fhll-service settings.").
10. See, e.g., AAMC REPORTER, supra note 3 ("Officials at Houston's Texas Orthopedic
Hospital said specialty hospitals can perform routine orthopedic procedures three times faster
than the average general hospital, with an infection rate of less than one percent and high
patient satisfaction.").
11. American Medical Association, 2003 Legal Issues: Economic Credentialing-Issues
and Answers (2003), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resourceslegal-
topics/current-legal-topics/2003.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter AMA, Eco-
nomic Credentialing]. See James W. Marks and Jayme R. Matchinski, Conflicts Credential-
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"[h]istorically, [where] hospital credentialing decisions ha[d] been based
almost exclusively on qualitative criteria and a physician's clinical compe-
tence.' 2 GSHs typically argue that in order to be able to offer essential but
"unprofitable" services, such as an emergency room, obstetrics, pediatrics,
and critical care, they need to "protect" their market in highly lucrative
practice areas, such as orthopedics and cardiology. 13 As such, GSHs have
been known to:
refuse to grant initial or continuing staff privileges to physicians
who own or have other financial interests in competing healthcare
entities, refer patients to competing entities, have staff privileges
at any other area hospitals, or fail to admit some specified percen-
tage of their patients to the hospital. Alternatively, the hospital
might require a physician seeking privileges to sign a loyalty oath
or pledge to perform a certain percentage of medical services at
the hospital.
14
The AMA opposes the consideration of economic criteria unrelated to
patient care in deciding whether to grant privileges to physicians:
15
The AMA believes that the practice of conditioning a physician's
medical staff privileges on an agreement to refer patients only to
that hospital is a violation of the anti-kickback law .... Whether
called loyalty oaths or conflict of interest policies, the effect is the
same. These practices ... negatively impact a physician's prerog-
ative regarding patient care as well as patient choice.
16
In Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, doctors challenged in court the policy of
economic credentialing in South Dakota. 17 In that case, a hospital refused to
credential doctors because they apparently had a competing financial inter-
ing: Hospitals and the Use of Financial Considerations to Make Medical Staffing Decisions,
31 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 1009, 1015 (2005). See also Beverly Cohen, An Examination of
the Right of Hospitals to Engage in Economic Credentialing, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 705, 708
(2004); Judith E. Orie, Economic Credentialing: Bottom-Line Medical Care, 36 DuQ. L.
REV. 437,441 (1998).
12. John W. Jones, Legal Implications of Economic Credentialing, PHYSIcIAN'S NEWS
DIGEST (April 2006), available at http://physiciansnews.comlaw/406jones.html.
13. Elizabeth A. Weeks, The New Economic Credentialing: Protecting Hospitals from
Competition by Medical Staff Members, 36 J. HEALTH L. 247, 248 (2003), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=959196#.
14. Id.
15. AMA, Economic Credentialing, supra note 11.
16. Id.




est. 18 The South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the hospital could base its
decision to grant or deny credentials for economic reasons rather than quali-
ty of care.' 9
The court... recognized that the hospital relied on 'the profitable
neurosurgical services' in order to be able to continue offering
'other unprofitable services' in the ... area. The court's decision
seemed informed by the unique economics of hospital financing
that require cost-spreading [to] fund[] treatment for uninsured and
underinsured patients.2 °
In Little Rock, the situation of Janet Cathey, a gynecologist, presents a
conspicuous example of economic credentialing. 2' For twenty years her
medical practice was centered at the Baptist Medical Center.22 Baptist is the
largest health care system in Arkansas and is the preferred provider for Ar-
kansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the state's biggest health insurer.23 In-
deed, Baptist is Blue Cross's only acute care hospital in Little Rock.24 Ca-
they's husband joined a group of Baptist doctors who were opening the
Arkansas Surgical Hospital.25 In anticipation of competition from the new
Arkansas Surgical Hospital, Baptist established an economic credentialing
policy, 26 prohibiting doctors "with a direct or indirect financial interest in a
competing hospital" from having privileges at Baptist's hospitals.27 Indeed,
"[t]he [new] policy applies not only to physician investors in such facilities,
but also to their immediate family members-with no right to a hearing or
appellate review.,
28
Cathey was informed by Baptist that under the terms of the new con-
flict-of-interest policy, once Arkansas Surgical Hospital opened, her ap-
pointment and clinical privileges at Baptist would end.29 Thus, as a result of
her husband's involvement in Arkansas Surgical Hospital, Cathey was no
longer entitled to admit patients or perform procedures at Baptist.30 Because
18. Mahan, 621 N.W.2d at 153.
19. Id. at 156-59; Choudhry et al., supra note 9.
20. Weeks, supra note 13, at 251-52 (footnote omitted).
21. Berkely Rice, Economic Credentialing: When Hospitals Play Hardball, MEDICAL
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most of her patients were insured by Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
Cathey's loss of privileges at Baptist would destroy her practice and deny
her patients the choice of care they once had.3' That is, the largest insurer in
Arkansas (like most insurance companies) directs its customers to certain
hospitals-usually GSHs.32 So, even if Cathey wanted to perform surgical
services at a specialty hospital, her patients' insurance company would not
have paid for a significant portion of the expenses that would have been
covered had the patients gone to Baptist. Thus, economic credentialing-
coupled with the oligopolistic arrangements that GSHs have with major
insurance companies-effectively squelches significant competition from
specialty hospitals.
Similarly, Baptist stripped privileges from six cardiologists who are
part-owners of Little Rock's Arkansas Heart Hospital.33 Cathey and the
cardiologists sued separately.34 The cardiologists were granted a preliminary
injunction, but, on appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court remanded the case
back to circuit court (trial court) for further findings. 35 On remand, the cir-
cuit court again granted a preliminary injunction on behalf of the cardiolo-
gists, and that injunction was also appealed. The Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed that injunction.36 And, after trial, the circuit court issued a perma-
nent injunction against Baptist in February 2009, enjoining the application
of its economic credentialing policy.
37
Much has been written on whether economic credentialing is an-
ti-competitive. 38 Some courts have found it not so, 39 and GSHs have suc-
31. Id.
32. As Mr. Banko stated in his letter to me, "Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield
represents 75% of the insured market in Arkansas, so there is little to no negotiation based on
price in that segment of the population." Letter from Peter D. Banko, President and Chief
Executive Officer, St. Vincent Health Ctr. to author, at 1 (Aug. 14, 2009) (on file with au-
thor).
33. Rice, supra note 21.
34. Cathey obtained an injunction against Baptist and settled shortly thereafter. Cathey
v. Baptist Health, No. CV-2005-5701 (Cir. Ct. Ark. Apr. 18, 2005).
35. Baptist Health v. Murphy, 362 Ark. 506, 511, 209 S.W.3d 360, 364 (2005).
36. Baptist Health v. Murphy, 365 Ark. 115, 132, 226 S.W.3d 800, 813 (2006).
37. Baptist Health v. Murphy, No. CV-2004-2002 (Cir. Ct. Ark. Feb. 27, 2009).
38. See Anne S. Kimbol, The Debate Over Specialty Hospitals: How Physician-
Hospital Relationships Have Reached a New Fault Line Over These "Focused Factories ",
38 J. HEALTH L. 633, 663 (2005) (arguing that specialty hospitals are helpful entities and that
there should be limits on economic credentialing); Tracy A. Powell, The Permissibility of
Conflicts Credentialing (A/K/A Economic Credentialing) by Traditional Hospitals as a Re-
sponse to the Growth of Specialty Hospitals, 20 HEALTH LAW. 17 (2007) (concluding that
laws governing economic credentialing are not settled but that economic credentialing may
be legal in some cases); Weeks, supra note 13 (concluding that many of the new forms of
economic credentialing violate state and federal antitrust statutes). See generally William E.
Berlin, Antitrust Implications of Competition Between Physician-Owned Facilities and Gen-
eral Hospitals: Competition or Exclusion?, 20 HEALTH LAW. 1 (2008) (detailing recent de-
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cessfully argued that they should not be required to hire employees who are
at the same time actively competing with them.40
In addition to the use of economic-credentialing policies, GSHs have
sought to legislatively and regulatorily eliminate specialty hospitals. GSHs
often argue that (1) the specialty hospitals threaten the viability of GSHs by
skimming off revenue-generating cases that finance unprofitable basic ser-
vices and (2) the specialty hospitals create conflicts of interest when physi-
cians refer patients to their own hospitals for financial reasons. 4' Through
the first argument, GSHs seek to subsidize unprofitable areas within their
hospitals by reducing consumer choice. Through the second argument,
GSHs seek to impose non-market-based (i.e., ethical) restrictions only on
the actions of doctors with financial stakes in specialty hospitals.
There is no doubt that society needs both the profitable and currently
"unprofitable" groups within GSHs. The question is how to ensure contin-
ued viability of GSHs or other entities providing the services not available
at specialty hospitals. GSHs often attempt to do so by running specialty
hospitals out of business through competitive and noncompetitive devices.
The cost of such a proposal is that the often better care provided at specialty
hospitals-for the areas that they cover-will be lost in an effort to subsid-
ize the unprofitable centers at GSHs. In Placing Profits Above Hippocrates,
I stated that such an approach is not good for public health.
III. ST. VINCENT'S RESPONSE
In response to Placing Profits Above Hippocrates, Peter Banko, Chief
Executive Officer of St. Vincent Health System, wrote to dispute my con-
clusions. He agreed that economic credentialing is not the answer to address
the existence of physician-owned specialty hospitals, but he took issue with
the various other points raised in Placing Profits Above Hippocrates. As
Mr. Banko stated:
velopments in case law, antitrust legislation, and potential defenses to litigation against eco-
nomic credentialing); Beverly Cohen, An Examination of the Right of Hospitals to Engage in
Economic Credentialing, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 705 (2004) (surveying case law, state law and
federal law and concluding that there are few instances in which economic credentialing is
foreclosed).
39. See, e.g., Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, 621 N.W.2d 150, 160 (S.D. 2001) (citing
Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1390, 1401 (D. Md. 1993)); Hutton v.
Mem'l Hosp., 824 P.2d 61, 63 (Colo. App. 1991); Sarin v. Samaritan Health Ctr., 440
N.W.2d 80, 82 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Lewin v. St. Joseph Hosp., 146 Cal. Rptr. 892, 906-
07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
40. Cohen, supra note 38, at 729 (citing Rosenblum v. Tallahassee Reg'l Med. Ctr., No.
91-589, slip op. at 3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 18, 1992)).
41. AAMC REPORTER, supra note 3.
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I am not an economist or an attorney, but I live in the practical
world of health care each and every day. I would like to take this
opportunity to present to you a deeper rationale why physician
owned specialty hospitals are not in the best interest of our medi-
cal community and our community as a whole.42
Mr. Banko states his general thesis as:
[L]imited service physician owned specialty hospitals are not in
the best interest of our society. They are truly competitive agents
entering an irrational health care market where pricing is con-
trolled and information is limited. They drive up utilization of ex-
pensive health care services that increases costs for the employers
and, consequently, every consumer. They skim profitable health
care services and profitable patients that are used to subsidize un-
profitable yet essential services (emergency, obstetrical, and psy-
chiatric care as well as care for the Medicare population) and care
for the poor and underserved. The quality of their care is good for
those without complication or co-morbidities, but truly disastrous
for those that need extra attention and support.43
I address Mr. Banko's main concerns below.
A. Competitive Forces in Health Care
As Mr. Banko states: "True competition does not exist in the health
care market. Therefore, you cannot use competitive market argument to
support the existence of physician owned specialty hospitals.
'"4
My argument in Placing Profits Above Hippocrates, however, was not
that the health care environment reflects a purely competitive market. It
surely does not. But market competition does exist, and should be consi-
dered, in the health care field. Hospitals routinely put on television and print
advertisements promoting quality, services, and physicians. In fact, St. Vin-
cent advertises in various forms, including with large billboards proclaim-
ing, inter alia, that it is the first Accredited Chest Pain Center in Little Rock.
(Arkansas Heart Hospital is the second.) This is a direct appeal to consum-
ers-using competitive market forces to attract business. Moreover, few
dispute that "[c]ompetition in health care markets benefits consumers be-
cause it helps contain costs, improve quality, and encourage
42. See Letter from Peter D. Banko, President and Chief Executive Officer, St. Vincent
Health Ctr., to author, supra note 32.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id. at 1.
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innovation,"a5although, as Mr. Banko's position makes clear, not all support
this notion.46
Mr. Banko continues that "[h]ealth care is not a rational market (in the
truest sense of definition) for the following reasons.' 47 Mr. Banko states that
"[c]onsumers of health care suffer from a lack of adequate information
about what services they need to buy and which providers offer the best
value proposition." 48 This is true. But, again, it does not serve as a basis to
eschew market forces in health care.49 Consumers often access comparative
data and quality grading on hospital quality.50 Further, insurance companies
often post comparative hospital data on their websites;51 Medicare provides
comparative data between medical facilities;52 and legislation has promoted
better informed health-care consumers.53
Moreover, informational disadvantages are always a reality in any
market system.54 The goal with such circumstances is to increase consumer
45. FTC Bureau of Competition, Competition in the Health Care Marketplace,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
46. Harvard Business School, Porter and Teisberg on Redefining Health Care,
http://www.hbs.edlrhc (last visited Mar. 7, 2010) ("Health care is on a collision course with
patient needs and economic reality. In today's dysfunctional health care competition, players
strive not to create value for patients but to capture more revenue, shift costs, and restrict
services. To reform health care, we must reform the nature of competition itself.").
47. Each of Mr. Banko's primary rationales will be addressed in seriatim.
48. Banko, supra note 32, at 1.
49. See Barrett S. Moore, Comment, Trust Me, I Do This All the Time: Comparative
Provider Statistics and Informed Consent in Arkansas, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 609,
610 (2009) ("In 1990, the New York State Department of Health undertook a state-wide
study of open-heart surgeries, controlling-for the first time in any study of that scale-the
independent variables of physician and hospital choice. After controlling for twenty addi-
tional components that could account for variation in the surgical risk factor, the New York
Department of Health found a marked difference between the success rates of New York's
individual hospitals and heart surgeons. This study allowed patients, for the first time, to
evaluate a doctor or hospital as an independent risk factor.").
50. See, e.g., HealthGrades, Research Hospitals, Doctors, and Nursing Homes,
http://www.healthgrades.com (last visited Mar. 7,2010).
51. See, e.g., Blue Access for Members, Blue Cross Blue Shield,
http://bcbsil.sqctool.com/ (log-in required) (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
52. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Medicare Hospital Com-
pare, http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
53. See, e.g., SUSAN S. LAUDICINA ET AL., BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASS'N, STATE
LEGISLATIVE HEALTH CARE AND INSURANCE ISSUES: 2007 SURVEY OF PLANS 6 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.cahc.net/documents/Acrl7.pdf ("[Arkansas] [lawmakers enacted two
laws to promote greater provider transparency. Under HB 1513, the Arkansas Hospital Asso-
ciation will make price and quality information about its member hospitals available to the
public. Hospital-acquired infection rates will also be publicly disclosed (HB 2735).").
54. Nobelprize.org, The Prize in Economics 2001-Press Release,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/press.html ("Many markets are
characterized by asymmetric information: actors on one side of the market have much better
information than those on the other. Borrowers know more than lenders about their repay-
[Vol. 32
DON'T BANK ON BIG MEDICINE
knowledge and prevent misrepresentation in the market place,"5 not to elim-
inate market forces and patient choice. The fact that GSHs themselves ad-
vertise with the goal of creating informed consumers demonstrates at least a
recognition of market forces and consumer choice in health care.
B. Doctors' Profit Motives
Mr. Banko continues that because
patients don't know a great deal about medicine, they rely on the
opinion of physicians for decision-making. Consequently, the
physician becomes the agent of the patient. Since physicians are
paid on a fee-for-service basis, if they don't have enough work or
income, they can increase the amount of services for their patients
(with a simple stroke of a pen on a prescription pad). 6
While some of what Mr. Banko asserts may be true, it is not clear (1)
how this differs between GSHs and specialty hospitals, (2) how this situa-
tion differs from other service industries, and (3) how this argues in favor of
eliminating specialty hospitals.
Mr. Banko seems to suggest that physicians, or at least those at special-
ty hospitals, are not ethical or cannot serve as trusted advisors to their pa-
tients. This criticism seems misplaced. Notwithstanding attempts at eco-
nomic credentialing by many GSHs and, in part, as a result of court deci-
sions striking down such policies, many of the physician investors in spe-
cialty hospitals are still on staff at GSHs.57 While they do not have owner-
ship stakes in the GSHs, they-no less the doctors who are full-time em-
ployees of the GSHs-have an interest in the GSHs making profits, as well
as the unit in which they work.
ment prospects, managers and boards know more than shareholders about the firm's profita-
bility, and prospective clients know more than insurance companies about their accident
risk.").
55. Robert Steinbuch, Preventing Under-Equipped Medical Facilities from Killing
Heart-Attack Patients: Correcting Inefficiencies in the Current Regulatory Paradigm for
Providing Critical Health-Care Services to Patients with Acute Coronary Syndrome, 17
HEALTH MATRIX 17, 46-50 (2007).
56. Banko, supra note 32, at 1.
57. See, e.g., MICHAEL 0. LEAVITT, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
STUDY OF PHYSICLAN-OWNED SPECIALTY HOSPITALS REQUIRED IN SECTION 507(c)(2) OF THE
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, at 34
(2005) [hereinafter HHS REPORT] ("We found that a significant number of specialty hospital
owners 'took emergency call' at competitor hospitals, which was to the benefit of both the
specialty hospital owners and the competitor hospitals. Local acute general competitors




Further, the then Secretary of the Health and Human Services Admin-
istration disagrees with the assertion that physician owners of specialty hos-
pitals excessively refer patients to their own institutions relative to their
peers at GSHs:
We examined the extent to which physician-owners refer Medi-
care patients to other facilities, given the financial incentive to re-
fer patients to their own facility. In two cardiac hospitals visited,
owners had a clear preference for referring inpatient cases to their
owned hospital, with 65% and 75% of all their cases admitted to
their hospital. In the third specialty cardiac hospital visited, own-
ers referred almost the same percentage of cases to their facilities
as to competitor hospitals in the area. Physician-owners in all or-
thopedic/surgery specialty hospitals visited, except for one, re-
ferred most of their orthopedic or surgery inpatient cases to their
competitor hospitals. This is not surprising, given the very small
inpatient census at these hospitals. Consequently, we did not see
clear, consistent patterns of preference for referring to specialty
hospitals among physician owners relative to their peers.58
Moreover, in the cardiac hospitals in the HHS study, the average own-
ership share per physician in heart hospitals was only 0.9% and 2.2% for
orthopedic/surgery hospitals.5 9 The implication being that such a small
ownership is hardly likely to incentivize doctors to act unethically.
In fact, at St. Vincent, at least some doctors also provide work on an
incentive basis-where they are compensated based in part on the quantity
and complexity of the procedures they perform. St. Vincent outsourced its
emergency room to an excellent service provider (EmCare), which routinely
has a blended pay structure, providing for greater compensation when the
amount of services is increased.60 This is the type of incentive scheme that
Mr. Banko appears to criticize. I disagree with the wholesale critique of
productivity-based compensation that Mr. Banko seems to be now suggest-
ing. Such a system recognizes that while doctors might be tempted to over-
treat, they are bound by ethical and scientific principles to do otherwise.
Moreover, checks and balances, such as case managers, claim adjustors,
utilization review managers, peer review processes, and CMS mean-
58. Id. at ii (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. See Kelly A. Carter, Brian C. Dawson, Kori Brewer & Luan Lawson, RVU Ready?
Preparing Emergency Medicine Resident Physicians in Documentation for an Incentive-
Based Work Environment, 16 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 423, 423-28 (2009); John Proctor,
Gauging Emergency Physician Productivity: Are RVUs the Answer?, AM. C. EMERGENCY
PfYsICIANs, PRAC. RESOURCES, http://acep.org/practres.aspx?id=30306 (last visited Mar. 3 1,
2010).
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deviation databases that could result in a CMS audit if treatment patterns
appear unjustified, serve to deter improper behavior.
Indeed, Mr. Banko admits that "[p]rivate insurers and government
payers use a variety of controls on service availability to rein in physician
inducement and practice variations to control demand similarly to how phy-
sicians can control supply."'6' Thus, the concern that doctors in specialty
hospitals will somehow uniquely abuse patients' trust and ethical principles
seems further misplaced.
In addition, the concern that service providers may overstate custom-
ers' needs-where customers may not be well-informed on their own-
exists throughout any service industry.62 This is not typically a basis to dis-
miss customer choice. Rather, it is a basis for effective regulation and con-
63sumer education.
C. Transfer Protocols as a Measure of Quality-A Dangerous
Comparison for GSHs
Mr. Banko states that:
I believe you could make the argument that competition can be
based on quality and service and you did just that with your
statement that 'generally better care [is] provided at specialty
hospitals.' There are studies both supporting and refuting that
premise, so I will speak from personal experience. St. Vincent has
never transferred a patient to a physician owned specialty hospital
for 'generally better care.' However, we do receive multiple trans-
fers from those specialties when patients get into trouble. If you
have an infection and need an infectious disease physician or you
have lung issues and need a pulmonary specialist or your kidneys
start to malfunction and you need a nephrologist (the list goes on),
61. Banko, supra note 32, at 2.
62. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Taking the Scare Out of Auto Repair,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/autos/autl3.shtm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010)
("The best way to avoid auto repair rip-offs is to be prepared. Knowing how your vehicle
works and how to identify common car problems is a good beginning. It's also important to
know how to select a good technician, the kinds of questions to ask, and your consumer
rights.") (emphasis added).
63. See Texas Attorney General, Consumer Protection, Car Repairs,
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/consumer/car repair.shtml ("[T]he Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act includes some sections that deal with auto repairs. Under this law,
it is illegal to: 1. Knowingly make a false or misleading statement about the need for parts,
replacement or repair services. 2. State that work has been done or parts were replaced when
that is not true. 3. Represent that goods are original or new, when in fact they are second-




you are out of luck at that physician owned specialty hospital be-
cause those physicians aren't available to help you. In those un-
fortunate situations, the physician owned specialty hospital trans-
fers you to a general service hospital (like St. Vincent) to bail
you, your family, and that invested physician out of a mess.
64
However, the Secretary of Health and Human Services stated:
Based on the population of all specialty hospitals, the proportion
of patients transferred from cardiac hospitals to competitor hos-
pitals is about the same as the proportion of patients transferred
between competitor hospitals. The proportion of patients trans-
ferred from cardiac hospitals to competitor hospitals who were
severely ill was similar to that of patients in the same Diagnostic
Related Group (DRGs) who were transferred between competitor
hospitals. Consequently, the notion that specialty cardiac hospit-
als are transferring more severely ill patients to general hospitals
was not supported by our study. Patients transferred into cardiac
hospitals have slightly lower severity levels on average than pa-
tients transferred into competitor hospitals for cardiac services.
Due to the small number of cases, no conclusions could be drawn
about the severity levels of transfer patients in the physician-
owned orthopedic/surgery hospitals.65
It bears repeating that I believe St. Vincent is a very good institution
and one that I would choose over various others depending on the circums-
tances. However, the notion that specialty hospitals are a recipe for disastr-
ous outcomes-or that GSHs such as St. Vincent do not ever transfer pa-
tients for higher-level care-is inaccurate.
St. Vincent-as a GSH-offers a wider array of services to its patients.
Thus, as Mr. Banko asserts, if a patient needs multiple services, he may be
better off going to St. Vincent versus a specialty hospital. But St. Vincent
itself will transfer patients to other facilities when those patients need a lev-
el of care that St. Vincent aptly decides it cannot provide. That is not a basis
for denying the value of St. Vincent--or, by analogy, specialty hospitals. It
is unclear why an intermediate-level care provider should argue against
specialty hospitals because of transfer protocols without subjecting itself to
the same criticism.
64. Banko, supra note 32, at 2.
65. HHS REPORT, supra note 57, at iii (emphasis added).
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And while St. Vincent may not have transferred any patients to special-
ty hospitals, other GSHs, to their credit, have. 66 This interest-of-the-patient
approach should be lauded, not discouraged.
In addition, a true story of one patient serves as at least some anecdotal
evidence as to the usefulness of specialty hospitals. Recently, a patient with
chest pain went to St. Vincent one evening because he was concerned about
the risk of heart attack.67 He was asked his age (under 30) and whether he
was on any drugs (no). Upon receiving answers to these questions, he was
told that the emergency room was busy and he would have to wait. After
receiving the same instruction to wait fifteen minutes later, the patient left
St. Vincent and went to Arkansas Heart Hospital. He was seen immediately
in the emergency room. Because the patient had an irregular electrocardio-
gram and raised nonspecific blood enzymes, the emergency-room doctor
admitted him to rule out a heart attack.68 This strikes me as a positive out-
come for the patient. I know that he was greatly relieved to have the option
of going to Arkansas Heart Hospital.
D. Health Care Ownership
In discussing the lack of pure competition in the health care market,
Mr. Banko aptly suggests that there are different financial obligations on
health care institutions depending on their status: "Entities providing health
care services can range from for-profit to not-for-profit to public entities.
These ownership difference interject taxes, mandates for charity care to
support 501(c)(3) status, and/or public subsidies that create imbalances in
the health care market."
69
Mr. Banko is correct that there are different types of hospital owner-
ship, including for-profit, nonprofit, and government owned. For-profit sta-
66. Interview with Carrie Helm, Chief Executive Officer, Arkansas Surgical Hospital,
North Little Rock, Ark.
67. For a discussion of related issues, see Robert Steinbuch, Regulatory Changes for the
Treatment of Patients with Heart Attacks, 99 AMER. J. CARD. 1166 (2007).
68. D.R. O'Neill, Low-Risk Classified Chest Pain Patients: Do They Need Cardiac
Monitoring in the Emergency Department and Can They Be Cared for in Non-Monitored
Beds?, 10 AUSTRALASIAN EMERGENCY NURSING J. 58, 58 (May 2007) ("All chest pain pa-
tients are triaged to monitored beds within the emergency department where they are ob-
served awaiting test results."); Associated Press, 'Super X-Ray' Rules out Heart Attacks
Faster (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/34019246/ns/health-
heart health/ ("About 6 million people each year go to hospitals with chest pain, but only a
small fraction are truly having a heart attack .... [There are many] people who did not have
clear signs of a heart attack from those blood tests or EKGs, but doctors are afraid to send
them home without more tests [because] [b]etween 4 percent and 13 percent of such patients
will have a missed diagnosis of a heart attack, and up to one quarter of that group will die...
69. Banko, supra note 32, at 2.
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tus, however, is not indicative of just physician-owned specialty hospitals.
Quorum, HCA, and other health care corporations that run GSHs are for-
profit facilities, as well.
Moreover, for-profit hospitals have the same obligation to contribute to
the care of the uninsured and under insured, but they also pay a significant
amount of taxes that nonprofits such as St. Vincent avoid. As a conse-
quence, the Secretary of Health and Human Services concluded:
The specialty hospitals in the study provided financial informa-
tion that allowed us to compute their taxes paid and their uncom-
pensated care as a proportion of net revenues. Because the spe-
cialty hospitals are much smaller than their competitors, their
share of the total uncompensated care in the community was very
small. On the other hand, the specialty hospitals paid real estate
and property taxes, as well as income and sales taxes, whereas
non-profit community hospitals did not. As a result, the total pro-
portion of net revenue that specialty hospitals devoted to uncom-
pensated care and taxes combined exceeded the proportion of net
revenues that community hospitals devoted to uncompensated
70
care.
E. Treatment for All
Mr. Banko suggests that specialty hospitals do not treat all patients:
"Federal mandates for emergency care (and subsequent stabilizing care)
regardless of ability to pay bind hospitals to provide treatment for all. Our
mission at St. Vincent Health System calls us to provide treatment for all,
but physician owned specialty hospitals have managed to avoid these man-
dates.' Mr. Banko continues, stating, "Roughly, 85% of the hospitals in
the United States lose money on Medicare patients. 72
70. HHS REPORT, supra note 57, at iii-iv (emphasis added) ("Considering only the
hospitals in the six study sites, the specialty hospitals provide a greater level of net communi-
ty benefits, as we defined it, than competitor hospitals. Even if costs in excess of Medicaid
payments are considered as uncompensated care, both cardiac and orthopedic/surgery spe-
cialty hospitals in the study still contributed a higher level of net community benefits than
competitor hospitals. Only if Medicare DSH payments are not offset against uncompensated
care in the NFP hospitals, is the net community benefit of competitor hospitals similar to the
cardiac hospitals, but it would still be less than the orthopedic hospitals. The cardiac hospit-
als in this study provided a not insubstantial level of uncompensated care that exceeded the
levels provided by competitor hospitals, after offsetting DSH payments."). Id. at 59.
71. Banko, supra note 32, at 2.
72. Id. at 3.
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However, specialty hospitals routinely treat a diverse patient base, in-
cluding a very large Medicare component.
All of the cardiac hospitals (16 were operational in 2003 for more
than a year) were built exclusively for cardiac care. They treated
about 38,000 Medicare cases, which represent 80% of the cases
treated in 2003 by all physician-owned specialty hospitals. Medi-
care patients account for a very high proportion of inpatient days,
averaging 67% nationwide.73
Moreover, specialty hospitals are subject to the same EMTALA regu-
lations applied to all hospitals, and in Arkansas all licensed acute care hos-
pitals must have emergency rooms. 74 With that said, GSHs-being much
larger institutions than specialty hospitals-typically have much larger
emergency rooms than specialty hospitals. The size of the emergency room
is a direct function of the overall size that the institution itself (GSH or spe-
cialty hospital) voluntarily has chosen to become.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Banko and I have different philosophies. Mr. Banko wants patients
to be directed to GSHs like his, so that they may spread the wealth of profit-
able centers in the hospital to the "unprofitable" ones. Mr. Banko describes
his position as follows:
Stroke care, diabetes care, trauma care, emergency care, obste-
trical care, and psychiatric services are just a few of the highlights
of the other unprofitable services at general service hospitals.
Dealing with a car accident or a stroke with a parent or your new
baby or the stigma of mental health services is certainly where
general service hospitals benefit you and our community each and
every day (relying on more profitable services to pay for those
that can't).
75
Of course, the "unprofitable" centers provide useful services. Profita-
bility, however, is an issue of finance, not medicine. As a patient advocate,
a patient relative, and a patient myself, I want the best care available-
especially for critical health issues, such as cardiac care. After all, heart
disease remains the number one killer of Americans.76 And the Secretary of
73. HHS REPORT, supra note 57, at ii.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
75. Banko, supra note 32, at 3.
76. See Steinbuch, supra note 55, at 17.
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Health and Human Services seems to think that I might at times be better
off at a specialty hospital:
Based on an analysis of the claims from the population of special-
ty hospitals, the cardiac hospitals delivered a high quality of care
that was as good as or better than their competitor hospitals. Be-
cause of the small number of discharges, a statistically valid as-
sessment could not be made for orthopedic/surgery hospitals. Pa-
tient satisfaction was very high in both cardiac and orthoped-
ic/surgery hospitals, as Medicare beneficiaries enjoyed large pri-
vate rooms, quiet surroundings, adjacent sleeping rooms for their
family members if needed, easy parking and good food.77
So, the inquiry becomes how do we pay for the services that Mr. Ban-
ko describes as "unprofitable." He wants to do so by eliminating for patients
the option of going to hospitals that-according to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services-potentially provide better care for what Mr. Banko
undoubtedly views as the greater good of redistributing profits to spread
income to subsidize "unprofitable" areas within his hospital.
I would seek an alternative approach. I am not comfortable with big
medicine deciding where I and other patients can go for treatment and what
quality of care I and other patients can get. I prefer an approach that leaves
greater, not less, control and choice of health care in the hands of not-so-
uninformed patients, their families, and their personal doctors. That freedom
of choice, I believe, is essential for quality health care and best reflects the
American spirit.
77. HHS REPORT, supra note 57, at iii (emphasis added).
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